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Telecommunications Consumers: A Behavioural Economic Analysis 
 
1.  Introduction 
It is no exaggeration to state that the consumer response to the liberalisation of a range of 
formerly state-run markets, including networked utilities and telecommunications, has 
generally surprised economists. In theory, the opening up of these markets to competition 
allows consumers to be active in choosing the best and lowest cost suppliers, producing 
upward pressure on quality, downward pressure on prices, and an overall increase in 
consumer surplus and economic efficiency. To some extent, this may have happened, but 
what surprises is the degree to which consumer behaviour seems to depart from this ideal 
competitive scenario. Research in energy markets has revealed large numbers of consumers 
failing to switch to lower cost suppliers (Giulietti, Waddams-Price and Waterson, 2005). The 
majority who do switch fail to select the best available deal and a sizeable proportion of 
consumers who switch in order to make savings actually manage to increase their bills 
(Wilson and Waddams-Price, 2010). Similarly, evidence suggests that many consumers of 
internet and mobile telephone services choose suboptimal contracts (Lambrecht and Skiera, 
2006; Grubb, 2009). Where such large proportions of consumers fail to select the best 
offering, the effectiveness of competition is undermined. 
 
Explanations for suboptimal consumer choice are increasingly sought in the findings of 
behavioural economics. Economic decision-making is subject to a range of “behavioural 
biases”, whereby agents systematically depart from the behaviours implied by the 
assumptions of neoclassical microeconomics (for review see Rabin, 1998; DellaVigna, 2009).1  
Because behavioural economics is a relatively new sub-discipline and one that has generated 
a broad and rapidly moving scientific frontier, the precise implications of its findings for 
competition and consumer policy are hard to determine. Yet there is widespread agreement 
that such implications are important (Garcés, 2010; Rosch, 2010; Micklitz et al., 2011) and, 
moreover, that policymakers and regulators need to consider the possibility that behavioural 
biases cause considerable consumer detriment (Bennett et al., 2010; Lunn and Lyons, 2010). 
If so, there may be scope for devising new interventions to protect consumers (e.g. Faure 
and Luth, 2011).    
  
This paper focuses specifically on the consumer telecommunications market, concentrating 
on domestic fixed-line telephony, mobile telephony and internet provision (with some 
references made also to television services, which may feature in bundled offerings). The 
                                                                                 
1 It is usual to refer to these phenomena as “biases”. Due to its prevalence, this terminology is unavoidable and is 
also adopted here. Yet it is arguably unfortunate. The term “bias” implies behaviour that is irrational or mistaken 
and hence damages welfare. But whether behaviour that violates standard economic rationality axioms causes 
detriment in real markets is an empirical question, the answer to which cannot necessarily be assumed. 
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core argument is that the decision-making environment faced by telecommunications 
consumers is unique and likely to make the sector prey to strong behavioural biases. The 
present contribution hence shares its motivation with other work that highlights specific 
markets in which behavioural biases might be expected to be particularly prominent, such as 
health insurance (Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2008). The broader aim is to employ relatively 
recent advances in behavioural research to illuminate issues that warrant specific attention 
from policymakers in the areas of competition and consumer protection. 
 
An initial examination of telecommunications markets is immediately suggestive. Following 
widespread liberalisation, offerings have become increasingly innovative, complex and 
difficult to compare. Many consumers have proved reluctant to switch provider, with around 
half not even considering a switch (Xavier and Ypsilanti, 2008). Furthermore, Xavier (2011) 
documents how in some countries telecommunications companies have been subject to 
increased levels of customer complaints about service quality and bills not matching 
expectations (so-called “bill-shock”).  
 
What follows is a systematic attempt to employ established findings in behavioural 
economics and consumer behaviour to locate possible barriers to effective competition and 
to identify potential sources of consumer detriment. Four aspects of telecommunications 
markets are identified, which in combination create a unique market likely to foment 
empirically established consumer biases. This general analysis is then employed to address 
two specific aspects of consumer behaviour of concern to policymakers: reluctance to switch 
provider and sub-optimal choice of tariff.   
 
Section 2 identifies the unique combination of features of modern telecommunications 
markets and explains why they raise concerns from a behavioural economic point of view. 
Section 3 uses these insights to examine unwillingness to switch providers. Section 4 
explores behavioural hypotheses relating to suboptimal tariff choice. While policy issues are 
referred to throughout, Section 5 summarises these and discusses the merits of policy 
responses, including the need for targeted research. 
 
2.  The Uniqueness of Telecommunications Markets 
In a regular transactions for goods or services consumers have a degree of uncertainty 
regarding the respective private values of products. There is variability and hence a need for 
judgement with respect to, for instance, the flavour of foods, the durability of durable 
goods, the fashionability of clothes, the punctuality and comfort of train journeys, the 
atmosphere in a favoured café, and so on. The extent to which the consumer gains surplus 
from the transaction selected depends upon the ex post value (or, if preferred, utility) at 
consumption, which must be evaluated ex ante at the moment of purchase. All consumer 
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transactions contain a degree of uncertainty over private value and, hence, over consumer 
surplus. Private value is probably least uncertain when consumers make routine choices with 
regular feedback, such as which breakfast cereal to buy, but perhaps much higher when 
choosing among products not previously consumed or experienced, such as new electronic 
equipment. Yet, most transactions, the decision is whether to spend a certain amount of 
money for a given quantity of the product, which is consumed sometime thereafter. 
 
The decision-making environment is different for the smaller number of products and 
services for which the consumer is billed following a variable flow of measured consumption, 
such as for domestic energy or telecommunications services. In addition to uncertainty over 
private value, there is uncertainty over usage and hence the final price that will be paid. The 
consumer may have a degree of choice over how this uncertainty is handled, through pre-
payment options or flat-rate price components, but uncertainty remains nonetheless. With 
pre-payment, the uncertainty transfers to the amount of time it will take to run out of credit 
and thus to require a top-up payment. With flat-rate components, the uncertainty transfers 
to the likelihood of staying within usage allowances, after which higher rates usually apply. 
Where no allowance is imposed, there is the possibility of failing to use the service 
sufficiently to warrant a high flat-rate payment, in comparison to the measured rate. What is 
common to each case is that consumers must anticipate their own future behaviour.  
 
With respect to domestic energy, usage is partly habitual and often partly regulated by 
machines, such as automatic heating systems and thermostats. Notwithstanding uncertainty 
over the weather, past levels of consumption (and therefore past bills) are likely to be a 
good guide to future consumption (and future bills). Telecommunications markets are not so 
simple. 
 
2.1  Four Key Characteristics of Telecommunications Markets 
Modern telecommunications markets have developed at least four non-standard 
characteristics. While it is probably the case that none is unique to telecommunications, the 
combination of them almost certainly is.  
 
First, modern telecommunications consumers often face complex decisions that require 
simultaneous judgments involving multiple, distinct dimensions of private value. The 
decision to purchase a particular service contract is often taken simultaneously with the 
decision to purchase equipment, such as a mobile handset, wireless modem, or perhaps a 
recording device for television programmes. The consumer may have to estimate quality 
trade-offs between the value of ongoing service and the immediate benefits of owning (or in 
some cases renting) the device associated with the offer. The complexity of simultaneous 
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judgement is greater still where different services are bundled, e.g. fixed-line and broadband 
internet, broadband and television, etc. 
 
Second, much of the value provided depends on factors unrelated to the product and 
provider. The private value of communication depends on who you communicate with and 
why: vital in emergencies; of higher value if you form a new relationship; of lower value if 
you become so busy that you under-use it; immediately improved by the discovery of a great 
new website; dependent on changes made by other organisations to on-line service 
provision; and so on. Telecommunications products enable access to people, information, 
entertainment, services and purchase opportunities. Private value depends on the perceived 
value of the combination of these often intangible benefits, which for the most part is not 
determined by the firm offering the product. 
 
Third, and perhaps most obviously, telecommunication in the digital age is subject to an 
extreme pace of technological change. Consumers regularly make purchase decisions in 
relation to equipment and services they are yet to experience. This is less true of ordinary 
fixed-line telephony, despite the increased availability of various dial-up services, but is 
especially true of mobile and internet services. Size, speed, functionality, reliability and 
design of equipment is under constant development, such that repeat buying of products is 
rare or even impossible due to obsolescence. 
 
Lastly, because telecommunications equipment and services now offer constant mobile 
access to immediate experiences, consumers make multiple and varied decisions in the 
market on a daily basis, requiring trade-offs between immediate costs and benefits and 
future ones. In simple terms, products provide consumption on tap, most of which is instant. 
Subject to the precise tariff structure, the consumer buys the continual right to purchase 
immediate social contact and entertainment, plus further opportunities to purchase a vast 
range of everyday goods and services for delivery. The volume and variability of instantly 
available offerings make this decision-making environment quite distinct from that of other 
billable services. For instance, from a decision-making perspective, domestic energy usage is 
primarily a matter of habit, with occasional adjustments required to maintain physical 
comfort. Communications equipment and services, on the other hand, are typically subject 
to multiple daily decisions relating to a very much broader range of experiences and 
opportunities of variable quality and duration.      
 
2.2  Consumer Decisions in Telecommunications Markets 
Orthodox microeconomic models of consumer behaviour treat telecommunications 
products similarly to other products. The consumer chooses the combination of price and 
quality that maximises utility, incentivising firms to produce quality offerings at minimum 
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cost. Yet classic market failures may occur. Large firms, perhaps especially former state 
monopolies, may be able to exploit market power. The insights of information economics 
caution that there is likely to be an asymmetry between firms and consumers with respect to 
the details of service contracts and the capability of products based on developing 
technologies. Telecommunications markets may also generate significant network 
externalities. These market failures have been identified in many markets and 
telecommunications markets are not unique in firm concentration, technological 
sophistication, nor capacity for network externalities. Yet, to a behavioural economist, 
modern telecommunications markets are unique, given the combination of characteristics 
identified.  
 
Consider first the decision to purchase equipment and sign up to a service. To assess the 
private value of a typical offering, the consumer must simultaneously judge the user-
friendliness and capability of multi-function equipment, alongside the quality and reliability 
of the enormous array of experiences to which the equipment grants access. Where the 
equipment and associated service are new to the consumer (e.g. when they first encounter 
mobile internet, faster communication, new forms of communication such as social 
networking or picture messaging, games, video and audio, or more likely a combination of all 
of these), they may have little in way of experience to fall back on. Most times when the 
consumer returns to the market, it will have changed. They will need to predict their own 
usage of another new piece of equipment and the still broader range of communication and 
entertainment experiences to which it grants access. To the difficulty of judging the private 
value of the equipment, service and potential communications experiences, must then be 
added the difficulty of judging the merits of the contract terms and the tariff structure. Note 
that even here the calculation is not as simple as predicting a level of usage and then seeking 
to minimise the cost, since the optimal level of usage is not independent of the tariff.  
 
Thus, the first three properties of telecommunications markets identified in the previous 
section (multiple value judgements, valuing varied experiences, speed of technological 
change) mean that the consumer’s initial purchase decision is fiendishly complex and is likely 
to involve much greater uncertainty over private value than is the case for consumer goods 
in general. There are at least three likely behavioural consequences. First, it is well 
established that consumers find complexity itself off-putting (Iyengar et al., 2004), leading 
them to avoid complex decisions and to fall back on rules of thumb or heuristics. Second, 
certain behavioural biases, including the endowment effect and status quo bias, are known 
to be stronger when private value is harder to assess (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002; 
Sayman and Öncülar, 2005). Third, both complexity and uncertainty over private value mean 
that the market is likely to be prone to “behavioural convergence”, whereby consumers copy 
the decisions of other consumers (e.g. Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Huang and Chen, 2006). 
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Thus far, we have considered only the purchase decision. But the fourth property of 
telecommunications markets, the requirement for ongoing decision-making, is also likely to 
have behavioural consequences. Even where the tariff consists of a substantial flat-rate 
component, consumers need to ration their usage relative to allowances of minutes, texts 
and megabytes. These decisions are again complex, but they involve another key dimension 
from the perspective of behavioural economics: time. Decision-making that trades-off 
immediate benefits and costs against future benefits and costs typically reveals time-
inconsistent preferences (Frederick et al., 2002; DellaVigna, 2009). The immediate is valued 
disproportionately highly relative to the future, such that most people discount time 
hyperbolically rather than exponentially, at least to a first approximation. One consequence 
is that “buy now pay later” transaction may lead consumers to over-consume, depending on 
the extent of temptation. In response, self-aware consumers may seek pre-commitment 
strategies, which come at a cost and vary in success. In short, even consumers who choose 
good deals for their intended usage may get poor value with respect to their actual usage.   
 
The same decision-making structure affects other markets, such as domestic energy 
markets, where consumers must weigh up the immediate comfort of being too cold or too 
hot against the size of a future energy bill. But the frequency and variety of such decisions is 
very much greater in telecommunications markets, where a consumer in possession of a 
mobile device has instant gratification constantly a click away, at a future cost. Furthermore, 
that future cost is likely to be less easily determined from experience, given the  lesser 
degree of familiarity with the product, multidimensionality of the product and complexity of 
tariff structures. In principle, firms might perceive competitive advantage in simplifying the 
decision-making environment for consumers, but there is little reason to presume that the 
market will provide such assistance. Where total price in a consumer markets is not 
immediately apparent upfront, it may be in firms’ interests to obfuscate prices (Gabaix and 
Laibson, 2006) or to capitalise on consumer mistakes (e.g. Grubb, 2009). 
 
In summary, a unique combination of features of the telecommunications market means 
that consumers are continually confronted with decisions of a highly complex nature 
involving multiple dimensions of uncertain value, with costs and benefits spread from the 
immediate to months into the future. The price they pay depends not only on which offering 
among very many they sign up to, but also on their ability to predict and control their own 
future behaviour. This level of complexity, uncertainty and the requirement for time-
consistent decision-making means that empirically established behavioural biases are likely 
to be particularly prevalent in modern telecommunications markets.       
3.  The Behavioural Economics of Switching 
The previous section provides the foundations for analysing an issue that has preoccupied 
policymakers: the apparent reluctance of consumers to switch providers. This is the subject 
of regular consumer surveys that have informed systematic investigations into switching in 
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telecommunications markets (see Xavier, 2011, for review). The primary focus is on what 
prevents more consumers from switching, with much less attention usually paid to 
estimating the size of the potential gains to consumers. The chief suspect is the costs to 
consumers of making a switch and the need for policymakers to find ways to force suppliers 
to cut such switching costs. Based on the above analysis, this section proposes an alternative 
view that is more consistent with evidence from behavioural economics and has alternative 
implications for policymakers also. The alternative view begins by returning to how switching 
costs are initially defined. 
 
3.1  The Concept of Switching Costs 
In Klemperer’s (1987) original demonstration of the impacts of switching costs on 
competition under oligopoly, switching costs were subject to a three-way categorisation: (1) 
transaction costs, which covered the time and effort required to complete the 
administrative process; (2) learning costs, which entailed the time and effort required to 
research other products and to learn to exploit brand-specific attributes; and (3) artificial 
costs imposed by firms, such as discounts for loyalty. Thus, costs were identified with time, 
effort or price. Subsequent influential work by Klemperer (1995) expanded the concept of 
switching costs to cover not only actual costs arising from expended time, effort and money, 
but also perceptions of  costs. More recent authors go so far as to define switching costs as 
“the perceived economic and psychological costs associated with changing” (Jones et al., 
2002, p.441, italics added), or “the real or perceived costs that are incurred when changing 
supplier” (Xavier and Ypsilanti, 2008, p.14, italics added). This equivalence between actual 
and perceived costs is arguably immaterial for economists aiming to build models of how 
firms might respond to consumer loyalty and the equilibrium prices that might ensue. But 
for policymakers, regulators, or researchers seeking to understand root causes of consumer 
behaviour, whether switching costs are genuinely high or misperceived to be high may alter 
conclusions.  
 
There is a point of scientific inference at issue here too. Expanding of the concept of 
switching costs to include perceptions keeps faith with rational utility maximisation. Thus, if 
a consumer fails to make a beneficial switch, the inference is made that some subjective 
“psychological cost” must have outweighed the potential gain. This inference is flawed, 
because there are other possibilities. The consumer may have made the decision on grounds 
other than self-interested cost-benefit analysis; or may have undertaken no decision-making 
process at all; or may simply have made a mistake.  
 
The inference that an observed failure to act in the face of a realisable gain must imply a 
countervailing psychological switching cost is to treat rational choice theory as unassailable 
and hence to engage in circular logic. This precludes other feasible explanations and 
confuses different explanations. Where switching costs are defined to include perceived 
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costs, misperception of switching costs cannot occur by definition – what is perceived is the 
switching cost as defined. Yet misperception of switching costs might be a crucial part of the 
explanation for non-switching. Misperceptions, motivations other than self-interest, and 
deviations from standard rationality axioms, are not switching costs. In what follows, 
therefore, switching costs are considered to be only actual costs of changing supplier, in 
terms of time, effort and money. 
 
3.2  The Role of Switching Costs 
Taking this approach, there is evidence to suggest that while switching costs have a 
significant impact, they may not be the main reason for the apparent disinclination to 
switch. Across the full range of telecommunications services, the large majority of 
consumers who do switch state that the process was relatively easy – only a small minority 
experience difficulty (Xavier and Ypsilanti, 2008; Ofcom, 2010). Moreover, the majority of 
consumers of fixed-line, mobile and internet services do not even consider switching 
provider over a twelve-month period. While some consumers (when prompted) cite hassle 
and not having the time as reasons for not switching, suggesting perceived switching costs 
do matter, more common reasons cited surround loyalty to present suppliers and worries or 
uncertainty about alternative suppliers. These reasons do not concern switching costs, but 
instead suggest worries about ending up with an inferior product, or perhaps a conservative 
preference for the existing provider. 
 
One interesting test of the importance of switching costs is the impact of mobile number 
portability (MNP). The cost of changing mobile number when switching supplier would seem 
ex ante to be high. In an international analysis of cross-sectional time series, Lyons (2006) 
finds statistically significant increases in churn following the introduction of MNP, provided 
the switching process is sufficiently short. Yet the effect of MNP on switching has 
nevertheless turned out to be much smaller than anticipated (Xavier and Ypsilanti, 2008). In 
the UK market, perhaps the most regularly surveyed and studied, switching has declined in 
recent years despite the introduction of MNP (Xavier, 2011).   
 
Overall, it is likely that switching costs deter switching, but responses to consumer surveys 
and the continuing low level of activity despite falling switching costs suggests other factors 
may cause reluctance to switch. 
 
3.3  The Endowment Effect and Loss Aversion 
Xavier (2011) points to the influence of the “endowment factor”, which he defines as the 
tendency for consumers to “value what they have more than what they might have” (p. 21). 
The reference is to the “endowment effect” (Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1990), 
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whereby experimental subjects appear to value a good that is owned more than the same 
good when not owned. The experiments show that, typically, we state a much higher 
minimum price to sell a good we own than the maximum we will pay to buy the same good, 
and that we are disinclined to trade a good we own for one we do not, but which we would 
prefer if offered a simple binary choice where neither good was owned. The hypothesis is 
that whatever psychological mechanism underlies this tendency is also be behind 
consumers’ unwillingness to switch providers. The decision structure is analogous, since a 
proportion of consumers appear to require the prospect of large gains before they will 
consider a switch and to stick with providers they would not choose were they to enter the 
market afresh. 
 
The endowment effect provides a good example of how established behavioural phenomena 
might interact with the uniqueness of the telecommunications market. One empirical 
regularity is that the endowment effect strengthens with uncertainty over private value 
(Horowitz and McConnell, 2002; Sayman and Oncular, 2005), such that whatever is presently 
owned can be valued at three, four, five, or even more times higher than when it is not 
owned. As argued in Section 2, telecommunications offerings are likely to be subject to 
greater uncertainty over private value than most consumer goods. Thus, to the extent that 
the psychology behind the endowment effect affects switching, it should be especially 
strong in modern telecommunications markets. Further empirical research is needed to 
establish and gauge the strength of the link between the two phenomena, but the evidence 
from consumer surveys is suggestive.  
 
From a policy perspective, however, establishing the nature of this connection is only part of 
the story. The policy implications are not unambiguous, because they depend on what 
causes the effect.  
 
The most widely accepted explanation is loss aversion. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
developed Prospect Theory as a descriptive theory of decision-making under risk. In 
monetary gambles experimental subjects’ choices implied that they weighted losses about 
twice as strongly as equivalent gains. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) incorporated loss 
aversion into a model of consumer choice, according to which consumers assign about twice 
as much weight to giving up an ordinary consumer good as to gaining the same good. 
Applied to willingness to switch telecommunications providers, the implications of  this 
theory are striking. Loss aversion on this scale means consumers may be foregoing 
substantial gains, because alternative providers would need to provide several times the 
consumer surplus of the current contract before consumers would be willing to switch. The 
suggestion of Tversky and Kahneman’s model is that this behaviour reflects a genuine 
consumer preference. The account therefore leaves policymakers in the awkward position of 
having to determine whether freely formed preferences are detrimental and whether 
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consumer policy should aim to override them, through public switching campaigns, 
promoting shopping around, and so on. 
 
However, neither the relevance of the endowment effect to decisions made in real markets 
nor the account based on loss aversion are uncontested. Plott and Zeiler (2005; 2007) 
managed to overcome the endowment effect in experiments by training subjects to realise 
they were missing out on ex post gains. List (2003, 2004) has shown through field 
experiments that the endowment effect is attenuated among experienced dealers in a real 
market. These findings suggest the effect may be less prevalent where consumers have 
experience. Kling et al. (2010) and Lunn and Lunn (2011) have produced dynamic models of 
the endowment effect that suggest foregone gains may be temporary, in both cases with 
some empirical support. These findings and alternative accounts question whether non-
switching telecommunications consumers forego additional surplus on a substantial and 
ongoing basis. Measured over a longer period the behaviour may be less disadvantageous 
than it initially appears from a snapshot of current offerings and market shares. Thus, the 
outcome of this scientific debate about causes of the endowment effect and the closeness of 
the analogy to consumer choice has implications both for the extent of consumer detriment 
and potential policy responses. 
 
3.4  Status Quo Bias 
The endowment effect is often linked to the broader concept in behavioural economics of 
“status quo bias”. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) first reported the tendency of 
individuals to stick with status quo choices after observing that new employees at Harvard 
University held retirement savings in substantially different portfolios compared with 
equivalent employees of longer duration. Experiments then confirmed the generality of the 
effect. For instance, if opinion survey respondents are asked to state which of two options is 
best, simply informing them as to which is the current option biases responses in that 
direction (Kahneman et al., 1991). This finding extends to surveys on choice of contracts for 
electricity supply (Hartman et al., 1991). 
 
The implications of status quo bias again depend not only on how strong an influence it is, 
but also on its cause. Loss aversion is again a possibility, but this requires the boundaries of 
loss aversion to be stretched, since status quo bias arises in situations where the decision-
maker does not personally give anything up. If status quo bias is caused by loss aversion, 
then individuals must be averse to losses accruing to others and to society generally. There 
are alternative explanations. The bias may be a general defence against unintended 
consequences. It is arguably reasonable to infer that the present option is less likely to result 
in an unanticipated bad outcome than an untried option. This logic is echoed in switching 
surveys, where some non-switchers worry about unanticipated mishaps during the switching 
process (Xavier and Ypsilanti, 2008). Another possible explanation is that the status quo 
12 
signals the preferences of other people. Facing an uncertain choice, the behaviour of others 
can convey helpful information, especially where an individual believes others may 
understand the available options better. Bikhchandani et al. (1998) coined the term 
“information cascades” to describe such inferences based on the choices of others, the 
existence of which is supported by extensive empirical evidence (Hirschleifer and Teoh, 
2003). The unique combination of features that characterises telecommunications markets, 
especially complexity and speed of technological change, makes them good candidates for 
information cascades and other forms of behavioural convergence such as herding (Huang 
and Chen, 2006; Rafaat et al., 2009), which may draw consumers towards providers with 
substantial market share and increase loyalty to such providers.   
 
Any status quo bias effectively presents a barrier to entry for new telecommunications 
providers, making it harder for them to attract customers. If loss aversion is to blame, 
policymakers face the same issue as with the endowment effect: should they seek to 
challenge consumers’ freely formed preferences? On the other hand, if uncertainty about 
quality and concerns about unintended consequences are to blame, ways might be explored 
to guarantee quality and to increase trust in multiple providers. 
 
3.5 Ambiguity Aversion 
The greater uncertainty over private value faced by telecommunications consumers also 
suggests another potential behavioural influence on switching: “ambiguity aversion”. It is 
well-known that we tend to be risk-averse, perhaps less well-known that we are more averse 
to certain kinds of uncertainty. Ellsberg (1961) showed that people prefer an option where 
risk can be quantified to one where it cannot, even if the actual risk faced is the same, i.e. 
we dislike ambiguity about the level of risk.2  Ellsberg’s work on ambiguity aversion was 
extended by Heath and Tversky (1991) and again by Fox and Tversky (1995), who developed 
and tested the “competence hypothesis”. The idea is that ambiguity aversion results from 
our feelings of competence, defined by how much we feel we know of what could be known. 
The competence hypothesis is supported by experimental evidence, showing that we prefer 
to take equivalent risks in relation to familiar events than unfamiliar events. Put simply, the 
more we know of the domain in question, the more willing we are to take on risk.  
 
Given technological change, multiple dimensions of value and ongoing innovation in tariffs, 
only a few consumers are likely to feel highly competent when selecting telecommunications 
equipment and contracts. Consequently, consumers may be unwilling to accept risks that 
they might accept in markets where they feel more competent. The competence hypothesis 
                                                                                 
2 Ellsberg showed this through examples of people’s willingness to bet on the colour of balls drawn from an urn. 
We instinctively value a bet more highly when we know that an urn contains balls of two colours split 50-50 than 
when we know that the urn contains balls of two colours in an unknown proportion, although the expected value 
of such bets is identical. 
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is, in effect, a heuristic: we assume that our familiarity with a domain of reasoning is a useful 
guide to how accurately we will be able to judge risks in that domain. How beneficial the 
heuristic is depends on how good this assumption is. Thus, this behavioural phenomenon 
again raises the awkward possibility for policymakers that encouraging consumers to switch 
is not necessarily beneficial. 
 
Empirical work by Wilson and Waddams-Price (2010) provides insight here. In a detailed 
study of the residential UK electricity market, these researchers had access both to switching 
decisions and actual usage patterns. Between 20 and 32% of consumers who tried to switch 
to a cheaper supplier in fact ended up paying more. Less than 20% switched to the supplier 
offering the highest saving. This means that even though the majority of switchers save 
money, the chance of a costly mistake when switching is substantial. The findings provide an 
estimate of the risk that consumers make a loss when switching in the residential electricity 
market; a risk that is likely to be higher for telecommunications products. Electricity is a 
standardised product consumed out of habit, with a relatively straightforward tariff 
structure and a market in which consumers have relevant experience. Given this, consumers 
ought to feel less competent when assessing telecommunications offerings than when 
considering electricity offerings. For many, therefore, reluctance to switch contracts may be 
sensible: with a substantial risk of making a mistake and thus paying more, attempting a 
switch may not be worthwhile.  
 
Hence, for policymakers, the potential role of ambiguity aversion is problematic. Even where 
potential benefits from switching exist, where the gains are substantial and where  
consumers are successfully urged to switch, actual gains may not be realised. Targeted 
research is needed to quantify the risks faced by marginal switchers and the likely returns to 
policies that successfully promote switching.   
 
3.6  Procrastination and Inertia 
Other behavioural findings may also be of relevance to switching. Because we value the 
immediate much more highly than the future, we also tend to be more willing to give up 
time in the future to do effortful tasks than we are to give up time in the present. Models of 
procrastination (e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001) show how hyperbolic discounting implies 
that we may decide to give up time tomorrow to complete a boring task such as wading 
through competing contracts for telecommunications services, but that when tomorrow 
comes around we take the same decision and put the task off again, and so on. Inertia may 
also be produced simply by inattention: in the absence of a salient signal of the benefits, we 
simply do not consider switching. Thus, even consumers who believe they would gain, or 
would believe so if they paid the matter attention, may fail to get around to switching.  
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Unlike the previous three behavioural biases, it is not clear that procrastination is likely to 
afflict telecommunications more than other markets. Inertia, on the other hand, may be 
increased by the complexity of the telecommunications market, since complexity is known 
to be off-putting to decision-makers (Iyengar et al., 2004). 
 
3.7  Summary of the Behavioural Economics of Switching 
The behavioural economic analysis of switching offered in this section has related five  
empirically established phenomena to the likelihood that consumers switch provider. The 
uniqueness of the telecommunications market, entailing greater complexity and uncertainty 
over private value than other consumer markets, means that four of these effects (the 
endowment effect, status quo bias, ambiguity aversion, inertia) can be expected to have a 
stronger influence in telecommunications. These phenomena are psychological regularities 
in human decision-making that mostly depart from the model of the consumer as a rational 
utility optimiser. They are not costs, psychological or otherwise, associated with switching, 
though they may be influenced by various perceived costs and risks.  
 
Because the causes and prevalence of these phenomena remain the subject of scientific 
debate, they raise more than four potential explanations for unwillingness to switch. More 
evidence is required to allow researchers and policymakers to determine what combination 
of these forces accounts for observed patterns of switching. Importantly, the behavioural 
analysis raises the possibility that while the extent of switching in the market can be 
considered an indicator of healthy competition, the widely adopted approach of 
encouraging consumers to switch and shop around may not necessarily lead to consumer 
gains. This thorny problem for policymakers is considered further in the final section. 
 
4.  The Likelihood of Suboptimal Choice 
As with other billable services, when telecommunications consumers choose between 
contracts, they must estimate future usage. Ultimate usage is determined by the cumulative 
effect of very many separate decisions about whether to make a call, send a text, read a 
blog, watch a video stream, play a game, and so on. Mobile telecommunications equipment 
means these decisions can be taken continually throughout the day. At any time consumers 
can incur future liabilities in return for instant rewards of great variety and uncertain value. 
The extent to which modern telecommunications markets present consumers with such 
decisions is probably unprecedented and brings another range of behavioural phenomena 
into play, those relating to time consistency and forecasting biases. This section examines 
the potential implications of this unusual time structure of decision-making. 
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4.1  Self-Control   
Time inconsistent preferences mean that we find it hard to resist immediate temptations for 
which we will pay a price at a later stage – people experience problems of self-control. This 
phenomenon has been observed in a number of markets (DellaVigna, 2009). It is therefore 
possible, even likely, that for a proportion of consumers day by day usage exceeds the level 
that they would more generally desire. In effect, parts of the telecommunications market 
have become a constant offer of zero-interest credit to purchase from a range of social and 
entertainment experiences. In this sense the market bears a resemblance to the markets for 
credit cards and store cards. Consumers in these markets are known to find it difficult to 
select optimal contracts because of failure to control usage (e.g. Ausubel, 1999). Self-control 
problems are likely to be compounded by online content that may be partly addictive, such 
as gambling opportunities, gaming, social networking, shopping or pornography. 
 
4.2  Pre-Commitment, Insurance and Peace of Mind 
People are frequently aware of their own self-control problems and field evidence shows 
that we seek pre-commitment strategies to constrain our future behaviour (Ariely and 
Wertenbroch, 2002; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004). From the consumer’s perspective, 
pre-commitment may make sense but can be costly. Gym-goers pay large upfront 
membership fees to incentivise themselves to exercise, but some undertake fewer gym 
sessions than they intend and thus experience little benefit at considerable cost. Smokers 
buy expensive small packets to try to reduce the amount they smoke, thus paying more per 
cigarette than they would buying cheaper large boxes. Indications of self-control costs in 
telecommunications include consumers who continue with pre-pay contracts despite the 
generally lower usage cost of bill-pay. Pre-payment offers a mechanism to aid self-control – 
one frequently imposed on children by parents.  
 
An alternative approach to self-control is to choose a tariff that appears to offer insurance, 
such as a flat-rate or three-part tariff.3  Pure flat-rates are often available for internet access 
and local direct-line telephony, with three-part tariffs more common for mobile services. 
Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) provide direct evidence of consumer detriment associated with 
such tariffs from an analysis of data from a German internet provider. The study examined 
usage records over five months of approximately 11,000 customers choosing among three 
types of tariff: a flat-rate and two three-part tariffs with different download allowances. The 
study built on a previous debate regarding the extent of detriment due to suboptimal choice 
of tariff in local fixed-line telephony (e.g. Train et al., 1987; Miravete, 2002), the context for 
which preceded much of the development of the unique features of modern 
                                                                                 
3 A three-part tariff involves a fixed fee in return for an allowance (or suite of allowances such as calls, texts and 
megabytes) of units of the product supplied at zero marginal price, with units consumed beyond the allowance 
charged at a positive marginal price, often a very much higher unit price.     
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telecommunications markets. Lambrecht and Skiera found many consumers on the wrong 
tariff. One-in-five on the flat rate would have had a lower bill on another tariff in each of the 
five months studied. More than half of the consumers on the three-part tariff with the 
higher fee would have fared better on one of the other two tariffs, mostly the one with the 
lower fee and allowance. A smaller proportion on both three-part tariffs (around 5%) would 
have been better on a higher fee or flat rate. Overall, the effects were large: the firm was 
more than doubling its customer lifetime value for consumers on the wrong tariff.  
 
This level of sub-optimal choice, identified over a choice of just three tariffs at a single 
provider, is striking and invites further investigation. To some extent it may reflect 
reluctance to switch tariff, for reasons discussed in the previous section. But when 
Lambrecht and Skiera surveyed customers of the provider, they found evidence that 
uncertainty over future usage played a role. The preference for the flat rate was associated 
with a stated desire for insurance against high bills, overestimation of likely usage and 
enjoyment of surfing without simultaneously worrying about increasing the bill (the “taxi-
meter effect”). The implication is that consumers are concerned about the relationship 
between intended use and actual use and will pay to neutralise this concern. 
 
Arguably, by paying for insurance against bill-shock and for the peace of mind of surfing 
without incremental charge, consumers on flat rates pay more for what is, in effect, an 
enhanced product. Yet they pay very much more. We do not know how the relevant 
consumers would respond if they became aware of the extent of the gap between the price 
presently being paid and what could be paid for the same level of usage, even if to some 
degree they benefit from peace of mind. 
 
4.3  Overconfidence and Miscalibration   
There exist alternative explanations for the sub-optimal consumer choice observed by 
Lambracht and Skiera (2006), however. Two related but distinct phenomena, often 
categorised under the umbrella term “overconfidence bias”, occur when people estimate 
future outcomes. First, we tend to be too optimistic in relation to our own outcomes. 
Second, we think our assessments are more accurate than they in fact are, so that the 
probability of outcomes far removed from our assessments are underestimated – we 
“miscalibrate”. Overconfidence of both types has been recorded in market settings 
(DellaVigna, 2009).  
 
An overly optimistic consumer will overestimate their ability to increase or decrease usage 
as desired. A miscalibrated consumer will underestimate variability in usage. Thus, 
overconfidence of both types means that both underestimation and overestimation of usage 
are more likely. Consequently, we should expect to observe, simultaneously, consumers 
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whose usage is too low on a flat rate and other consumers who overuse on a measured rate. 
In other words, overconfidence offers an alternative explanation for the results of 
Lambrecht and Skiera.  
 
Grubb (2009) shows that overconfidence among consumers can also explain why three-part 
tariffs are both offered by providers and accepted by consumers. If consumers erroneously 
believe that they will make sufficient use of but not surpass the allowance, they will find 
three-part tariffs attractive. Meanwhile firms will make extra profits from those who pay for 
service they do not use and those who pay high rates because they exceed allowances. The 
popularity of three-part tariffs is hard to explain through insurance, taxi-meter effects or 
overestimation of usage, none of which account for the high rates typically applied above 
the allowance, which consumers appear to think they will not end up paying. Analysing 
transaction data for student mobile telephone contracts, i.e. data from consumers who had 
recently made an active choice, Grubb (2009) confirms that a large proportion of consumers 
are on suboptimal tariffs. Many consume insufficiently to justify a high flat fee, while a 
smaller but still substantial proportion overshoot allowances and receive higher bills than 
necessary. Again, the effects are large relative to average bill size. 
 
4.4  Summary of the Behavioural Economics of Suboptimal Choice 
There is accumulating evidence that, in addition to reluctance to switch to better deals, 
telecommunications consumers who actively choose do so suboptimally, because intended 
usage does not match actual usage. This patterns can be linked to established biases 
surrounding self-control and overconfidence in estimation of future outcomes. For large 
proportions of consumers in both internet and mobile telephone markets the size of errors 
is significant in relation to the size of bills. These findings are consistent with the incidence of 
“bill shock”, which is one of the primary grounds for the increasing volume of complaints 
about suppliers (Xavier, 2011).  
 
From a policy perspective, three-part tariffs are arguably an indication of ineffective 
competition. Theoretically, such tariffs are economically inefficient, since they contain large 
ranges over which consumers face zero marginal cost and hence are likely to consume 
suboptimal quantities. If consumers make good choices, there is also little in the way of a 
theoretical rationale for the high rates charged for exceeding allowances. Empirically, these 
tariffs appear to exploit decision-making biases that result in a proportion of consumers 
making poor decisions. While these conclusions are presently drawn from a relatively small 
pool of studies, present evidence suggests that consumer detriment is considerable. 
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5.  Policy Implications 
The digital revolution and the enormous advances in information and communications 
technology that have occurred in recent years, and may continue to occur for some time to 
come, offer consumers opportunities for communication and entertainment that previous 
generations would doubtless have envied. Nothing contained in this article is intended to 
suggest that the overall benefits of these developments are not very large indeed. However, 
there are signs that competition within the telecommunications sector may be less effective 
than in other markets and that a sizeable proportion of consumers forego gains and choose 
suboptimal products.  
 
The need for consumers to make simultaneous judgements across multiple dimensions of 
value, to assess the value of hugely varied and often new experiences, to understand the 
possibilities afforded by new technology, and to make many time-consistent decisions per 
day, makes telecommunications markets unique. This decision-making environment is likely 
to foment behavioural biases, leading to a level of potential detriment that warrants 
attention from policymakers. This final section summarises policy challenges and tentatively 
suggests ways that they might, if not be met, at least be approached, including via 
improvements in understanding through targeted research.  
 
Consumers’ willingness to switch providers is considered an indicator of healthy 
competition. Yet while active consumers might generally be required for effective 
competition, the observation of a low level of switching in a market does not necessarily 
imply a positive outcome from policies that successfully manage to promote switching. Such 
an outcome requires that the marginal switchers who are spurred into action take beneficial 
decisions.  
 
Two as yet unanswered empirical questions are key from a policy perspective. First, how 
much surplus are consumers sacrificing by not switching to lower cost providers over the 
medium to long term? This question is, in principle, answerable through research that 
compares actual usage to available offerings among panels of consumers. The second 
question is less easy to answer. Why are consumers reluctant to switch? Section 3 
considered a number of hypotheses, but concluded that they lead to different policy 
implications.  
 
For instance, loss aversion is a descriptive rather than normative account of decision-making. 
If its role can be firmly established, the implication is that consumers have disadvantageous 
preferences; an arbitrary attachment to their existing provider that leads them to forego 
gains. If so, then encouragement from regulators and consumer protection organisations to 
overcome this attachment and to switch, through advertising, awareness campaigns, or 
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other salient ways to promote switching, might appear reasonable. Yet such interventions 
adopt the strident policy position that consumers making free choices in this market do not 
know what is good for them. Similar policy interventions might assist consumers to 
overcome procrastination or inertia.   
 
However, while failing to switch to the optimal provider is clearly not ideal, neither is 
switching for little or no gain. It remains possible that consumers’ disinclination to switch is 
more reasonable than it initially appears, based on the not insignificant probability of 
making an error when choosing between complex deals involving products of uncertain 
private value dependent on uncertain future behaviour. Consumers may correctly identify 
that, even knowing that there are gains to be made, they lack the expertise to harvest them 
reliably. If so, some policies designed to boost activity could backfire, prompting consumers 
to waste time and effort trying and failing to save significant amounts, or worse still signing 
up to inferior deals. Instead, policy might need to focus on ways to increase trust and 
guarantee quality in a market where consumers face uncertainty and cannot be expected to 
locate best value.  
 
Since the appropriate policy response depends on the cause of low switching, research that 
might identify that cause more clearly would be of great value. One possibility is to combine 
behavioural experiments and surveys with data on market behaviour at the individual level. 
In addition, research might focus on the marginal switcher. Do those who switch provider in 
response to promotions or campaigns make significant gains? What proportion make a loss 
and what are their characteristics?     
 
Section 4 highlighted good evidence that at least some consumers who do switch make 
routinely suboptimal decisions when deciding between tariffs, because of the difficulty 
matching intended and actual usage. The extent of consumer detriment could be even 
greater than estimated by the studies cited, which centre on a single firm or population of 
students, so policymakers would again benefit from research that estimates lost consumer 
surplus more accurately.  
 
Flat rates and three-part tariffs can be partly justified on the grounds that consumers enjoy 
consumption more when there is no meter continuously ticking away. But where bills are 
effectively being doubled by underuse and rates for overstepping allowances greatly exceed 
average per unit cost, there is a strong suggestion that flat-rate components within tariffs 
are exploiting consumer biases, making supernormal profits from those who overestimate 
and underestimate their usage respectively. Here, regulators might want to consider 
stronger interventions that limit the magnitude of higher rates relative to average per unit 
cost or that mandate particular types of salient feedback to those consumers who are paying 
more than they could.     
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One potential avenue for policymakers here might be to exploit the available technology to 
assist consumers in their decision-making. For instance, providers could be mandated to 
disclose easily interpretable information that can be used to monitor usage during the 
current billing period, in addition to feedback on previous periods. There is scope for 
experimentation here to determine the best form of disclosure. Providers, who are already 
able to offer a sophisticated range of interactive services, could be mandated to give 
consumers one-click access to easily interpretable data on their remaining minutes, texts or 
megabytes, just as they can observe the remaining power in a mobile battery. Such simple 
mechanisms might do much to aid self-control and improve usage estimates, and could be 
easily piloted for effectiveness. Given that technological advances in telecommunications 
give us such unprecedented access to innovative services and media, it would seem 
reasonable that they can also be used to make services more “decision-friendly”. 
 
Finally, one oft-repeated criticism of behavioural economic analysis is that it can lead to 
excessive intervention in markets and hence to higher costs. Two points need to be made in 
response. First, behavioural economics also suggests ways in which potential interventions 
can be assessed experimentally prior to implementation, to increase the likelihood of 
beneficial outcomes. Second, while the focus of the present discussion has been on seeking 
new solutions, the analysis also suggests there may be old regulations that ineffective and 
could potentially be scrapped. Miklitz et al. (2011) describe the modern consumer legal 
system as “saturated with information duties” (p. 272). Yet stringent requirements on firms 
to provide detailed information may do little to improve consumer decision-making and can, 
in some cases, even deter consumers from being active by increasing the perceived 
complexity of offerings. Thus, behavioural insights have the potential to increase the 
efficiency, as well as the effectiveness, of competition and consumer policy. 
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